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Abstract 
This paper first aims at assessing the economic and political importance of Mercosur for the 
EU’s interests in the short and medium run – say for the one or two coming decades or so. 
As  Mercosur’s  size  is  largely  determined  by  Brazil’s  size,  this  paper  focuses  on  Brazil  – 
although the paper assumes that, from Brazil’s perspective, a Brazil–EU preferential trade 
agreement (PTA) is a non-starter. It then aims at positioning the Mercosur–EU (MEU) PTA in 
the context of the EU’s current trade policy. In particular, it tries to assess, once one takes 
into account all the crucial goals to be met by the EU, whether the EU is likely to find the 
time and the resources necessary for dealing properly with a MEU PTA; this effort is notably 
complicated by the very divergent views on the role of trade between Brazil on the one hand, 
and  Argentina  and  Venezuela,  on  the  other  hand.  Finally,  the  paper  examines  the  PTA 
options that can be seen as reasonably feasible. It suggests that, unless there are dramatic 
changes in Mercosur’s present trajectory, the goal of negotiating a fully-fledged MEU PTA 
should be set aside for some time – at least a decade or so. This does not mean leaving the 
negotiating table, but rather focusing on negotiating topics that remain attractive to both 
sides in the current context, and manageable and flexible enough to overcome the broad 
general problems confronted by Mercosur and the EU. 
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Introduction 
This  paper  examines  the  likelihood  of  a  preferential  trade  agreement  (PTA)  between 
Mercosur and the EU, and its possible content. The term PTA, adopted by the related WTO 
report (WTO, 2011) is preferred to ‘free trade agreement’ (FTA) for two reasons. First is that 
the content of the 350 (notified to the WTO) to 550 (allegedly signed) FTAs does not qualify 
automatically for the ‘free trade’ term. Most of these FTAs have very poor market access 
provisions for trade in goods, and often none or WTO-minus levels for trade in services 
(Adlung and Miroudot, 2012) or concerning topics (non-tariff barriers, investment, public 
procurement, etc.) that are an integral part of 21st  century trade agreements. The second 
reason is that one of Mercosur’s economies – Brazil – is large enough in some sectors to have 
some impact on world prices. A trade agreement with another large economy, such as the 
EU, has the potential to generate notable discriminatory effects on the economies of the rest 
of the world. In such a context, the term ‘preferential’ is a useful reminder that PTAs among 
large economies may increase trade among the signatories, but to the detriment of trade 
between the signatories and the rest of the world. 
1.  Mercosur and Brazil viewed from the EU 
From the EU perspective, the importance of Mercosur is largely related to the importance of 
Brazil,  particularly  since  Argentina  has  shifted  to  a  strongly  protectionist stance  –  hence 
offering little, if any, prospect for fulfilling the EU’s general demand of deeper market access. 
The importance of Brazil for the EU can be measured in two ways. 
A broad political perspective 
From a broad political perspective, Brazil is one of the few important emerging economies 
with which the EU should interact on a permanent basis. This is because Brazil has been 
successful  at  establishing  itself  firmly  as  a  key  ‘voice’  of  the  emerging  and  developing 
economies in the trade and economic debates since the mid-1990s, and even more so since 
the  early  2000s.  This  new  Brazilian  approach  started  in  1995  when  Brazil  dropped  its 
uncompromising  tone  with  respect  to  the  Uruguay  Round,  allowing  its  successful 
conclusion. 
In the 2000s, it was clear that no deal in the Doha Round could be done without Brazil’s 
support. Brazil’s positions in the Doha negotiations were essential in many instances for the 
EU  because  Brazil  was  suggesting  some  concessions  from  the  emerging  and  developing 
countries  (compared  with  the  more  radical  Indian  views  and  the  more  cryptic  Chinese 
positions),  while  the  EU  was  trying  to  do  the  same  on  the  side  of  industrial  countries 
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(compared with the more radical US views). This relatively ‘centre’ position of Brazil has had 
the same appeal for the EU on issues other than trade, such as climate change or security. 
There are difficulties, however, with sustaining the tough but constructive dialogue between 
Brazil and the EU during the active years of the Doha Round, given the failure of the round 
in June 2008 and the economic crisis since then. 
  In Brazil, the balance between offensive and defensive interests has clearly shifted in 
favour  of  the  latter  under  President  Dilma  Rousseff’s  administration,  not  only  for 
purely domestic reasons but also because of the increasing pressures of the anti-trade 
approach followed by Argentina and Venezuela. 
  In the EU, the economic and monetary crisis has captured the full attention of the top 
decision-makers,  leaving  trade  a  frozen  issue  on  a  sidetrack  –  with  no  additional 
market opening but no substantial protectionist measures – until recently. 
Still, recent months have witnessed a widening gap between Mercosur and the EU. On the 
Mercosur side, the drift towards protection continues, which has even de facto gone farther 
when such issues as trade and exchange rates have been put on the table. By contrast, in late 
November 2012, the Council’s decision to give a mandate to the European Commission for 
negotiating a PTA with Japan suggests a drastic change of approach by the top EU policy-
makers to PTAs. But it must be stressed that this change of approach focuses on the US, 
Japan, Taiwan and China – all economies much larger, directly or indirectly, than Brazil’s. 
The  other  EU  trade  initiatives,  such  as  the  recent  launch  of  the  trade  negotiations  with 
Thailand, remain largely driven by the European Commission, with little interest from most 
EU member states, except when some narrow and key offensive or defensive vested interests 
of EU member states are involved (a situation that often creates sharp intra-EU conflicts 
during the last moments of a trade negotiation). 
Economic attraction 
This economic size factor deserves more attention. The fading of the EU’s political attraction 
to  Brazil  could  be  countervailed  by  economic  forces.  Yet  in  this  respect,  there  are  forces 
pulling in other directions, which, once combined, suggest that Brazil is not so high up on 
the EU’s economic and trade agenda. 
On the one hand, the economic crisis requires that the EU opens its markets in priority to 
economies that fulfil three conditions: they have to be very large, well regulated and well 
connected with the rest of the world by being the “hub” of PTAs (Messerlin, 2012). Only such 
economies have the necessary weight and energy to attract the huge if stuck EU-27 train, 
because they offer in scale and scope economies that are large and deep enough to have an 
impact on domestic relative prices in the EU. (Economic analysis shows that relative prices 
are what determine the comparative advantages of the trading partners, and thus the gains 
from trade.) 
Table 1 shows that, in the early 2010s, Brazil does not look like the most attractive country 
with respect to these three conditions. Its GDP represents only 11% of the EU’s GDP, much 
behind that of the US (86%), China (36%) and Japan (34%). Moreover, during the next two 
decades, Brazil is not expected to increase substantially its share of world GDP, meaning that 
there are more dynamic – hence attractive – economies for the EU. Not surprisingly, all these 
more attractive economies are located in East Asia, and – en passant – they are the industrial 
locomotives needed by resource-rich Brazil. Lastly, Brazil’s ranking in terms of governance is 
much behind that of the US, Japan and Taiwan. For the sake of comparison, Table 1 provides 
similar information on two countries (India and Russia), which are today the same size as 
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Table 1. Brazil’s relative attractiveness 
 
Notes: Chiwan refers to Taiwan GDP and GDP arising in China through Taiwanese firms. In the table, [a] 
and [b] refer to country rankings: the higher the country’s rank, the poorer is its regulatory performance. 
Category  [a]  is  the  ease  of  doing  business  (Doing  Business,  2012);  [b]  is  the  Overall  Index,  Global 
Competitiveness  Index  (World  Economic  Forum,  2011)  (sources:  Buiter  and  Rahbari  (2011)  for  growth 
estimates  and  WTO  Trade  Profiles  for  the  GDP  of  the  individual  countries  and  regions;  author’s 
calculations). 
Sources: Adapted from Messerlin (2012). 
On the other hand, Brazil is large enough to be a major international actor in some sectors: 
agriculture, raw materials and a few industrial sectors, including some that are intensive in 
highly skilled labour, such as aircraft. Even so, this sectoral importance does not create a 
situation propitious to the negotiations on a PTA with the EU for the following reasons: 
  The offensive interests in the EU that would be attracted to trade negotiations with 
Brazil are limited to a few sectors where Brazil has traditionally strong protectionist or 
opposite  interests:  manufacturing,  investment,  public  procurement,  intellectual 
property rights, etc. 
  The  defensive  interests  in  the  EU  against  Brazil’s  comparative  advantages  are  also 
limited and concentrated in some EU member states, as best illustrated by the EU’s 
agricultural sector. The absence of top EU policy-makers ready to give strong support 
to a MEU PTA gives a lot of power to these vested interests, even if they are tiny, as 
demonstrated by the many years of negotiations with little progress on tariff quotas in 
beef or other narrowly defined farm products. 
  Finally yet importantly, some defensive interests in Brazil are closely connected with 
key EU firms, as shown by the car industry. Indeed, some EU member states have 
crucial defensive interests in Brazil as well as in the EU – a relatively rare occurrence in 
the world trade system. This is the case of France, with the opposition of some (not all) 
French  farm  vested  interests  protected  by  the  common  agricultural  policy  and  of 
French carmakers happy to operate in Brazil behind high tariffs. 
In sum, the political economy of trade negotiations in the EU leave little hope for achieving 
meaningful results from negotiations on a fully-fledged MEU PTA. 
"Hub" quality
2010 2030 [a] [b]
1 2 3 4 5
EU 100.0 100.0 5 to 100 2 to 83 Korea, Turkey
Korea 6.3 6.7 8 22 EU, US, ASEAN, China
Brazil 12.9 23.5 126 58 Argentina
India 10.7 49.7 132 51
Russia 9.1 20.2 120 63
Japan 33.9 36.1 20 6 ASEAN
Taiwan 2.7 7.6 25 13 China, NZ, Singapore
Chiwan 5.1 14.6 (na) (na) (China)
China 36.2 168.6 91 27 Taiwan, ASEAN
EU market expan-
sion (% EU GDP)
Regulatory
quality4 | PATRICK MESSERLIN 
 
2.  Positioning the MEU PTA in the EU’s current policy context 
Trade policies are matters to be assessed in relative terms. It could have been the case that 
the EU’s political and economic attraction to Brazil/Mercosur might have been limited, but 
there was not a more attractive region than Mercosur in terms of trade policy for the EU. But 
that is not the case. Indeed, the EU has a few other, more attractive negotiating options that 
will be very intensive in time and human resources. In other words, the EU will have to set 
priorities.  What  follows  argues  that  a  MEU  PTA  does  not  pertain  to  the  likely  set  of 
priorities. 
Everything flows from the fact that the Doha Round is stuck. The key question is for how 
long. The answer to this question depends upon the causes for this stalemate: they are so 
many and diverse that optimism is not on the agenda. 
First, the Doha stalemate is related to trade issues. There are plenty of candidates for such an 
explanation:  the  existing  agreements  on  the  general  formulas  of  liberalisation  in 
manufacturing and agriculture are unfinished business, the exceptions to these formulas are 
only sketchy, there has been no serious examination of the liberalisation in services, and 
there is a host of topics – such as trade facilitation, duty-free, quota-free and other rules – 
that may look easy and close to a deal at first glance but which have ended up as a source of 
deep disagreements in the bitter and tense mood presiding over the Doha negotiations since 
June 2008. 
Second, the Doha stalemate is not so much about trade issues as the vision of international 
governance  –  that  is,  a  much  deeper  and  wider  cause.  The  June–September  2008  period 
revealed the fundamental opposition between the US and China. The US view is that the 
emerging  economies  –  China  being  the  first  –  should  abide  by  the  same  rules  as  the 
developed countries, and that these rules and disciplines should be ‘strengthened’ – meaning 
that they should be much more similar to US rules and regulations than the current WTO 
disciplines. In sharp contrast, China, followed by all the emerging economies, argues that the 
current  WTO  regulations  are  quite  adequate  for  the  emerging  countries,  including  the 
‘special and differentiated treatment’ provision (the bête noire of US trade policy since the 
early 1990s). 
In this context, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) should be perceived as an attempt by the 
US to create a ‘WTO version 2.0’ that is much more favourable to its views than the current 
WTO. Indeed, it is interesting to note that Susan Schwab (the US trade representative in 
2008),  who  had  the  authority  to  strike  a  deal  at  the  2008  WTO  ministerial  but  left  the 
negotiating table in June 2008, made the US pivot towards East Asia in September 2008 when 
she announced US intentions to join and lead the TPP. 
The second cause (global governance) suggests that the Doha Round is going to be in a coma 
for a long time. Such a situation opens the door to a totally new game in the world trade 
regime – the emergence of ‘mega PTAs’. The largest world economies (China, the EU, Japan 
and the US) are starting to look for bilateral PTAs among themselves in order to harness 
their domestic growth on larger, more dynamic markets that are better regulated. This is a 
decisive  shift  away  from  the  usual  PTAs,  which  have  been  largely  limited  to  bilaterals 
between  a  large/very  large  economy  and  much  smaller  economies  (Messerlin,  2013).  It 
introduces an additional motive for the EU to focus on PTAs with countries like Japan or 
Taiwan:  such  PTAs  offer  the  best  insurance  policy  against  a  successful  Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and a successful China–Japan–South Korea PTA. 
Combining the ‘growth’ argument of section 1 (the necessity for the EU to focus on large, 
dynamic  and  well-regulated  trading  partners  in  order  to  boost  its  growth)  and  the 
‘insurance’ argument (the dramatic shift of the world trading system to mega PTAs among THE EU–MERCOSUR PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT: A VIEW FROM EUROPE | 5 
 
large  economies)  leads  to  one  strong  conclusion  for  the  EU:  for  the  decade  to  come,  in 
addition to an EU–US PTA, the EU should concentrate its trade negotiating strategies on two 
PTAs  –  Japan–EU  and  Taiwan–EU  (the  attraction  of  the  latter  being  related  to  the  links 
between Taiwan and mainland China) (Messerlin, 2012).  
This conclusion relies also on three additional factors: 
  The first is largely based on political economy aspects. Only these three PTAs (four 
with a China–EU PTA) will be able to attract the attention of the top decision-makers in 
Europe, hence to evade the risks of being captured by relatively small lobbies. No EU 
head of state or government will neglect a PTA with these three countries. 
  The second argument is technical. One should realise how complex such negotiations 
will be if one wants to have the expected pro-growth impact of PTAs on EU domestic 
growth. These three PTAs have to be truly deep and comprehensive, and hence to 
address  very  difficult  issues  that,  for  many  of  them,  have  never  been  solved 
satisfactorily  in  existing  PTAs  (including  in  the  EU  internal  market,  the  archetypal 
PTA): mutual recognition in norms for goods and in market regulations on services, 
the  right  legal  framework  for  intellectual  property  rights,  state-owned  enterprises, 
investment rules, etc. 
  Finally yet importantly, these PTA negotiations will be sequential – not concomitant 
like those in the WTO forum. In other words, negotiators for the Japan–EU PTA should 
care about the negative consequences of this PTA on the South Korea–EU PTA, so that 
EU  and  Japanese  firms  investing  in  South  Korea  are  not  hurt  by  discriminatory 
provisions of the Japan–EU PTA. Similarly, negotiators of a Taiwan–EU PTA should 
keep in mind future negotiations on a China–EU PTA – a must if the Doha Round is 
stuck for years (because China will then be the world’s largest economy, and the EU 
will be smaller in relative terms, the EU will need to harness its growth to the large 
Chinese economy). 
In this context, the EU’s fragile decision-making process will have a hard time to devote all 
the needed attention in the years to come to negotiations on PTAs with countries, such as 
Brazil  (or  India),  that  are  dragging  their  feet  and  that  will  become  truly  attractive  in 
economic terms to the EU only within a couple of decades – when Brazil (or India) will 
eventually be big, dynamic and better regulated enough, compared with the EU economy. It 
is only then that these countries will attract the attention they deserve from the EU’s top 
decision-makers, and hence they will escape the risks of being captured by a few of the EU’s 
offensive interests as well as being fought by a few of its defensive ones. 
3.  What should be done? 
If a successful, fully-fledged MEU PTA is out of reach, what then should be done? A first 
option  would  be  to  suspend  the  negotiations,  as  was  done  in  2004.  This  option  is  not 
satisfactory  because  it  leaves  the  ground  free  for  the  powerful  protectionist  forces  in 
Mercosur.  It  assumes  that  Brazil  will  not  be  exposed  to  the  ‘growth’  and  ‘insurance’ 
arguments that are driving EU trade policy, and that it will be only driven by its Mercosur 
strategy. That may be the case – and protectionist vested interests in Brazil will certainly 
push for a strong Mercosur focus. But, it may also be the case that Brazil wants to insure 
itself against the emerging mega PTAs. In particular, the TPP includes countries that are 
efficient exporters of agricultural products and of commodities – and thus have the capacity 
to make life very difficult for Brazilian exports to Japan, for instance. In this scenario, Brazil 
would look with increasing favour upon a fully-fledged MEU PTA. 6 | PATRICK MESSERLIN 
 
This section looks at the alternative option: What are topics for which negotiations could 
continue with a good chance of being concluded successfully, and thereby prepare a return 
to the table of negotiations on a fully-fledged MEU PTA in the coming decade or so? 
Answering  this  question  requires  a  method  aimed  at  identifying  the  topics  that  should 
remain on the negotiating table, and it requires some attention to be paid to the negotiating 
process per se, that is, to the choice of the most efficient instruments of negotiation. 
Identifying the topics to keep on the negotiating table  
Column 1 of Table 2 lists the topics that seem out of reach in the current context. It includes 
all those closely related to trade and to market access, such as tariff cuts or disciplines on 
export barriers. Since the Mercosur countries have presently lost interest in market opening 
as a support policy for their growth, these topics should be dropped and postponed until the 
appropriate time when both parties are ready for negotiations on them with a serious chance 
of economically meaningful results. Trying to get a few tariff cuts here and there, often under 
the economically unsound form of tariff quotas, is likely to have little positive economic 
impact.  By  contrast,  it  is  likely  to  have  big  and  negative  political  effects,  since  any 
disturbance in the sectors subjected to these complicated aspects of liberalisation would be 
systematically  attributed  to  the  liberalisation  by  the  protectionist  lobbies,  even  if  the 
liberalisation was insignificant (‘reluctant’ liberalisation relying on complicated mechanisms 
is self-defeating). 
That said, column 1 includes investment because what has recently happened to foreign 
firms running businesses in Mercosur (from oil in Argentina to retail trade in Venezuela) 
leaves few doubts that this topic is not on the negotiating agenda. Still, as investment is not a 
Mercosur competence, it remains a possible area of negotiations between the EU and some 
members of Mercosur. The same observation could be made for trade in services. It would be 
useful to review the list of services in order to see whether bilateral agreements between 
some Mercosur countries and the EU in some services could be envisaged. 
Table 2. Identifying topics to keep on the table of negotiations 
 
Note:  Topics  followed  by  an  asterisk  could  be  the  subject  of  negotiations  between  the  EU  and  some 
Mercosur members. 
Source: Adapted from Horn et al. (2009).  
Trade topics preparing
market access
1 3
Industrial tariffs & equivalents Anti-corruption Information society  Customs administration 
Agricultural tariffs & equivalents Approximation of legislation  Labour market regulations  Technical barriers to trade
Export taxes & equivalents Audiovisual  Mining  Sanitary & phytosanitary measures 
Antidumping & Safeguard Civil protection  Money laundering  Industrial cooperation 
Countervailing measures  Consumer protection  Nuclear safety  Research and technology 
State trading enterprises Cultural cooperation  Political dialogue Environmental laws 
Competition policy  Data protection  Public administration  Financial assistance 
State aid  Economic policy dialogue  Regional cooperation  Visas for workers
Public procurement Education and training  Small and medium enterprises 
Intellectual Property Rights Energy  Social matters 
Trade in services agreement  * Health  Statistics 
Trade-related investment measures * Human rights  Taxation 
Investment & movement of capital * Innovation policies  Terrorism 
Illicit drugs  Visa for asylum, illegal immigration
2
Non-trade topics often included 
in "comprehensive economic and trade agreements"
Trade topics focusing
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Column  2  of  Table  2  lists  all  the  topics  at  the  ‘periphery’  of  trade  matters  that  are 
systematically  tabled  in  the  context  of  a  ‘comprehensive’  economic  and  trade  agreement 
negotiated by the EU. It is a long list of items of a very different nature, often political (and 
indeed politically sensitive) – from illegal immigration to corruption to human rights. The 
absence  of  a  fully-fledged  PTA  between  Mercosur  and  the  EU,  and  the  current  inward-
looking political mood in many Mercosur countries are likely to make the negotiations on 
these topics awkward and unsuccessful. Once again, however, the fact that almost all of 
these topics are not under Mercosur’s exclusive competence leaves the possibility of bilateral 
agreements on certain of these topics between the EU and the interested Mercosur members. 
Finally,  column  3  of  Table  2  presents  the  topics  that  seem  to  be  the  best  candidates  for 
successful negotiations in the current context. All of them are characterised by three main 
features: 
  they are useful whether market access is limited or not, 
  they  are  very  important  for  making  any  future  market  access  liberalisation  truly 
meaningful, and 
  they  are  not  under  Mercosur’s  exclusive  competence,  and  hence  offer  a  degree  of 
flexibility allowing the willing Mercosur members to go ahead. 
This list is composed of two very different elements. First are topics related to ‘norms’, such 
as  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures  for  agricultural  products,  norms  and  standards 
(technical barriers to trade) for industrial goods (and regulations in services if some services 
pass the test of interest at this stage of the EU–Mercosur relations). They are also related to 
domestic good governance – another way to prepare an economically sound, fully-fledged 
trade agreement. Finally, as these topics raise complex problems, they often require time and 
trust to be solved. Time can be shortened if the MEU negotiators agree to look at similar 
agreements already concluded between Chile (or Mexico) and the EU on such topics, and to 
check  whether,  mutatis  mutandis,  those  agreements  could  not  be  adapted  to  Mercosur 
members willing to negotiate on such issues. 
This list also includes environmental issues, such as those related to climate change (Viola, 
2013), energy (Brazil is doomed to become a major oil producer (de Oliveira, 2012)), research, 
industrial cooperation and the transfer of technology (a topic high on the Brazilian agenda 
(Flôres, 2013)) and cooperation at the borders (customs administration, trade facilitation and 
visas for workers). 
Identifying the most efficient instruments of negotiation 
A key issue in the current EU–Mercosur negotiations is that each side – negotiators and 
markets – has lost trust in the process (and often in the other partner). The first goal for 
keeping the negotiations on track is to re-create such trust by delivering substantive results. 
Such a goal requires a careful choice of the instruments of negotiations. The history of trade 
negotiations shows  that such  instruments  can make  a  lot  of  difference.  For  instance, the 
simple formula of annual and equal cuts on all the goods with no exception included in the 
Treaty of Rome (1957) has proven a very efficient way to dismantle the tariffs among the 
founding EU member states – despite the deep differences among these countries on the role 
of trade in growth (with Germany and Benelux countries being convinced of trade as an 
engine  of  growth,  and  France  and  Italy  being  quite  sceptical),  and  indeed  to  the  great 
surprise of most observers at the time.1  
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Since a major field of potential agreements to be successfully negotiated by Mercosur and the 
EU in the current context consists of norms and more generally regulations, what follows 
focuses on defining the most efficient way to negotiate in terms of regulations, that is, the 
‘mutual recognition’ approach. 
The mutual recognition principle was articulated in the 1979 ruling on the Cassis de Dijon 
case by the European Court of Justice (Messerlin, 2011). It gave birth to two operational 
forms: 
  Mutual  recognition  can  be  ‘conditional’  upon  a  core  of  common  principles  to  be 
defined by negotiations among the trading partners. This form has been the traditional 
approach  of  the  EU  following  the  1979  Court  ruling. Initially, this  approach  raised 
huge  hopes  of  solving  the  problem  created  by  the  insurmountable  difficulties  of 
harmonising the existing regulations of the EU member states. But, conditional mutual 
recognition has rapidly shown its limits: many forces (from political pressures to anti-
competitive business pressures) have induced an expansion of the core conditions to 
the point that mutual recognition has become increasingly similar to harmonisation 
(the  situation  that  the  EU  wanted  to  escape).  In  the  meantime,  conditional  mutual 
recognition did not succeed in creating trust among EU member states – some member 
states  accuse  others  of  using  mutual  recognition  as  a  way  to  practice  ‘regulatory 
dumping’ by offering ‘cheap’ substitutes – or in enforcing EU regulations. 
  Alternatively,  mutual  recognition  can  be  defined  as  being  ‘unconditional’:  the  two 
signatories feel that they trust each other and their respective regulations enough to be 
able  to  recognise  unconditionally  the  partner’s regulations.  An  essential  element  of 
unconditional mutual recognition is to require systematically a preliminary step – that 
is, a joint process of mutual evaluation of the regulations in question by the negotiating 
partners.  This  step  of  mutual  regulatory  review  does  not  exist  in  the  conditional 
mutual-recognition approach. But it is crucial, because it offers the unique opportunity 
to build, or restore, trust among the signatories. Moreover, such a step requires the 
participation of the regulating bodies of the negotiating countries – not only from the 
traditional trade negotiators (such as the Directorate-General for Trade in the EU case). 
Enlarging  the  set  of  ‘negotiators’  to  skilled  ‘evaluators’  should  also  be  seen  as  an 
opportunity  to  create  some  dynamism  in  the  trust  among  negotiators,  and  more 
broadly among consumers from all the negotiating countries. 
The  EU  is  still  being  torn  apart  between  conditional  mutual  recognition  (the  dominant 
principle in norms and standards, with the ACAAs2 and their increasingly tight regulations, 
and the dominant principle in services during the 1980s and 1990s), and the unconditional 
mutual-recognition approach (the principle driving the EU Services Directive). 
Meanwhile, the emerging part of the world challenges this situation. It would be naïve to 
assume that a conditional mutual-recognition approach so prone to shifting to harmonisation 
is a workable principle in the coming mega PTAs (with the US, Japan or Taiwan–China). No 
partner  to  such  a  PTA  would  be  in  a  position to  impose  its  own  version  of  conditional 
mutual  recognition  (‘own  version’  meaning  de  facto  a  recognition  biased  towards 
harmonisation to its own regulations). 
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In  this  broad  context,  EU–Mercosur  negotiations  on  norms  relying  on  the  unconditional 
mutual-recognition approach would be the best option to consider, all the more because it 
has  two  additional  advantages.  First,  such  negotiations  can  be  easily  held  in  a  bilateral 
setting  (Brazil–EU,  Argentina–EU,  etc.),  giving Mercosur  members  the  needed  flexibility. 
Second, the negotiating teams (trade and regulatory experts) can be kept small. 
Concluding remarks 
This paper has stressed the long-term natural ‘partnership’ that has emerged between Brazil 
and the EU in trade during the two last decades. Yet Brazil (and much more some of its 
Mercosur partners) has expressed strong reluctance to use trade as an engine of growth. At 
the same time, the EU needs urgently to conclude trade agreements with countries large 
enough, well regulated enough and well enough connected to the rest of the world to boost 
its own growth and to make politically sustainable its macroeconomic and fiscal policies. It 
also needs to move urgently in order to insure itself against the discriminatory impacts of the 
other emerging ‘mega PTAs’. In the coming decade or so, Brazil does not fulfil these criteria. 
This divergence between Mercosur’s mood on trade and the EU’s desperate need for rapid 
growth  and  insurance  leaves  little  hope  for  a  successful  conclusion  of  a  fully-fledged 
Mercosur–EU PTA. By contrast, the paper argues that a lot can be done on crucial matters: 
norms in goods, possibly regulations in some services, climate change, energy, technology 
and some regulatory cooperation. Successful negotiations on these topics would not change 
dramatically the current level of market access. But they would create the much needed trust 
between the two sides of the Atlantic and they would magnify the results in terms of market 
access that could be achieved once the Mercosur members and the EU are in the same mood.  
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